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 Without money, it is near 
impossible for political parties and 
candidates to successfully compete in 
elections. Leaders’ tours, campaign signs, 
advertising and polling all cost money. 
This has always been the case, but in 
recent years, it has become even truer. 
Membership in and involvement with 
political parties in developed democracies 
has atrophied, leading to the 
phenomenon of “parties without 
members” (Scarrow, 2000).  This concern 
has been echoed in Canada. Research by 
Bill Cross and Lisa Young revealed a 
Canadian party membership base that is 
aging and only intermittently involved 
with party activities (Cross, 2004; Cross 
and Young, 2004). Alongside this trend 
has come the increased 
professionalization and sophistication of 
political parties (Panebianco, 1988). 
Polling and data analysis are now 
essential to identifying segments of the 
electorate that might be open to 
persuasion and manufacturing targeted 
appeals to voters (Marland et al., 2012; 
Issenberg, 2012; Delacourt, 2013).  
 Financial resources are thus 
required to research and develop the 
message. Party supporters may not be 
able to develop and deliver a finely tuned 
electoral message, but they can donate to 
efforts to do so. In this environment, 
financial contributions to political parties 
are an indispensable form of political 
participation. 
 Although money is an essential 
resource for political parties and 
candidates, it can also pose particular 
problems for democracy. Money can 
exacerbate inequality, create 
opportunities for corruption, and erect 
barriers that may reduce the accessibility 
of the party system. Unlike votes, the 
other essential currency of the electoral 
process, money is unequally distributed 
among citizens. If left unchecked and 
unregulated, this creates the potential for 
parties and candidates to be beholden to 
those who donate. Such a system can 
significantly advantage parties that 
appeal to the interests of those with 
money and create an unequal playing 
field. Ultimately, the influence of money 
could drive up the costs of participation in 
the electoral process to a level high 
enough to be a significant barrier to those 
without access to comparable financial 
resources (Harper v. Canada, 2004). 
Political party finances are almost 
always subject to state regulation. This 
regulation typically takes a number of 
forms. The first is provisions for financial 
disclosure. Most jurisdictions in Canada 
require that political parties and 
candidates disclose their financial affairs. 
Most critically, regulatory regimes 
typically require parties and candidates 
to reveal the identity of donors who give 
above a certain threshold. Financial 
disclosure has become the norm in 
Canada, primarily so that the public can 
connect political messages from parties 
and candidates with those persons or 
entities that have helped to fund the 
dissemination of those messages. 
The second typical component of a 
party finance regulatory regime is a limit 
on contributions and/or spending. Limits 
on contributions may restrict which 
actors are permitted to contribute to 
parties or candidates. Furthermore, 
legislation might limit donations to 
particular actors within a jurisdiction. A 
regulatory regime might also place limits 
on contributions, seeking to reduce the 
influence that any one donor might have 
on the process. There may also be limits 
on party and candidate expenditures 
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during elections or even during the 
period before an election. 
The third component is some level 
of public financial support. Public funding 
can be provided directly or indirectly. 
Direct public support often comes in two 
forms. First, it can be provided as a 
reimbursement of election expenses in 
order to help defray the costs of electoral 
competition. Second, it can be provided in 
the form of an allowance; the amount of 
an allowance is typically calculated by 
factoring the number of votes obtained by 
a party or candidate. Both forms can help 
reduce barriers to entry. Indirect public 
support, on the other hand, is usually 
provided as a tax credit for monetary 
contributions. By giving a tax deduction 
to those who donate, the state is 
subsidizing the donation and encouraging 
monetary contributions as a form of 
political participation. Such indirect 
public financing can be a significant 
component of the income for political 
parties (Jansen & Young, 2011). 
Although every jurisdiction in 
Canada regulates party and election 
finance, they each use a different mix of 
policy instruments (Elections Canada, 
2012).  Because of the importance of 
money to the electoral process, differing 
regulatory regimes can have a significant 
impact on the operation of parties within 
a political system. For example, there is a 
vigorous debate over the impact of 
extensive public support on the party 
system, with opponents of public 
financing arguing that such funding can 
estrange parties from their civil society 
roots and make it more difficult for new 
entrants to the party system to compete 
with established parties (Fisher, 2011; 
Beange, 2012). 
One of the challenges of assessing 
the impact of different party finance 
regimes is that factors other than 
campaign finance law also shape the 
activities and organization of political 
parties. Political parties respond to and 
mobilize divisions in the electorate, 
respond to institutional incentives 
created by the electoral system and 
legislative structures, and are shaped by 
the political culture in which they 
operate. Isolating the impact of electoral 
laws on party organization and activity 
can be difficult. For example, one of the 
important debates over the evolution of 
political parties involves the “cartel party” 
thesis, which posits extensive public 
financing for political parties as 
corresponding with a straining of the 
relationship between political parties and 
civil society as well as a decrease in 
competition between parties (Katz and 
Mair, 1995). Political scientists studying 
expanded public financing in Canadian 
national politics have found that a theory 
developed in the context of European 
politics does not fare as well in Canada 
given the countervailing pressures of 
Westminster parliamentary institutions 
and the single member plurality electoral 
system (Young et al., 2007; Katz, 2011). 
This makes the study of provincial party 
finance all that more important to test, 




Canada’s provinces provide 
exciting possibilities for comparative 
analysis. Although there are some obvious 
differences between provinces in political 
culture and party systems, and some 
minor differences between their 
legislative structures and electoral 
processes, most provinces differ less than 
states typically used in comparative 
analyses. Furthermore, the broad 
components of Westminster style political 
institutions and the single member 
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plurality electoral system are in place 
across jurisdictions in Canada. At the 
same time, provincial party finance 
regimes differ (Elections Canada, 2012; 
Blake, 2001(a)). Some provinces provide 
more public financing (including 
allowances) while others provide almost 
none. Canada’s provinces thus offer a 
laboratory to evaluate the impact of 
regulatory regimes. 
The exciting potential for 
comparative research on provincial party 
finance comes crashing against the reality 
of existing data limitations. The quality of 
available provincial party financial data 
varies. Most provinces make extensive 
financial data available on the Internet, 
but not all do. Most provinces only 
provide financial data for the last decade 
or so, limiting the likelihood of more 
extensive longitudinal analysis. Often the 
available data is not provided in a way 
conducive to research, requiring the 
transcription of data from scanned 
financial statements. Provincial election 
agencies often do not disaggregate 
corporate, trade union or individual 
donations, making even an elementary 
level of analysis challenging. Finally, 
comparative analysis can also be 
constrained because different provinces 
define some fundamental concepts 
differently (Blake, 2001(b)). Finally, in 
some provinces, annual financial 
statements include all party financial 
activity within that province for a given 
year; in other provinces, that is not the 
case. These barriers are not 
insurmountable, but they may be worth 
consideration by those responsible for 
regulation. 
In what follows, we embark on a 
preliminary and exploratory comparative 
analysis of provincial party finance in 
Canada. Our purpose is to illustrate the 
kinds of things that can be analyzed in 
this type of comparative framework. We 
chose British Columbia, Saskatchewan 
and Manitoba as our three comparative 
cases. These three provinces display 
variation in their party finance regimes 
and have available reasonably high 
quality financial data. We analyze party 
finances for the same four-year period in 
all three provinces: 2009-2012, inclusive. 
This captures one complete election cycle 
for each province. British Columbia held 
an election in 2009 while voters in 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba went to the 
polls in 2011. In all three elections, the 
incumbent party was re-elected to form 
government. Another advantage of these 
cases is that the New Democratic Party 
(NDP) is a present and competitive 
political actor in all three provinces, 
allowing for comparison of a single party 
brand across jurisdictions. Furthermore, 
in all three provinces, there are two 
dominant parties – the NDP and a right-
of-centre party. 
One significant limitation of our 
analysis is that we examine only 
provincial-level party finances. More local 
political actors – candidates and the 
electoral district associations of parties – 
also raise and spend money, and there are 
often significant transfers between the 
central party and local entities. We 
recognize that the vibrancy of these local 
entities is an important element of 
Canadian political parties and party 
finance in Canada (Carty, 2002; Carty and 
Eagles, 2005). Furthermore, party finance 
regulations can have an important impact 
on the balance between central and local 
party organizations (Katz, 2011: 77; 
Coletto and Eagles, 2011; Coletto et al., 
2011). Such analysis is beyond the scope 
of this article, but it is important to bear 
in mind that what follows is only part of 
the story of party financing in the 
provinces. We now turn to an 
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examination of each of the three cases 
and comparative analysis of provincial-






Voters and parties in British 
Columbia are polarized between 
materialist and post-materialist policy 
options (Blake, 1996(a); Blake 1996(b); 
Blake, 1985). Although the NDP often 
earns about 40% of the popular vote, the 
Liberal Party has now won four 
consecutive majority governments 
(Smith, 2010). In such a competitive two-
party system one might expect campaign 
finance law to be the subject of bitter 
dispute. However, campaign finance law 
does not appear to have been a major 
battleground.1 
The campaign finance provisions 
of the provincial Election Act have been 
subject to a series of amendments on two 
occasions during the past decade, in 2002 
and 2008. In both instances, save 
provisions for third party spending, 
amendments have mostly been 
administrative (Western, 2008). 
The 2002 amendments built upon 
the recommendations of the chief 
electoral officer following the 
administration of the 2001 general 
election. Perhaps the only significant 
amendment in 2002, relative to this 
article, was to prohibit charitable 
organizations from making financial 
contributions to political parties or 
candidates. 
The amending legislation of 2008 
changed over 30 provisions and was 
somewhat more significant for the 
purposes of our discussion. For example, 
whereas previously there was an election 
expense limit only pertaining to the 
campaign period, the legislation was 
amended to establish two separate limits 
in order to govern both the 60 day pre-
writ period as well as the campaign 
period. Also, the calculation of election 
expense limits would no longer be based 
on either the number of candidates 
endorsed by a party or the number of 
electors in an electoral district, but rather 
would be an absolute figure established 
by statute. Other changes included a 
prohibition on contributions from federal 
political parties, as well as the enabling of 
transfers between provincial constituency 
associations and between candidates of 
the same political party. 
Although the amendments of 2002 
and 2008 certainly affected how political 
contributions may be raised and election 
expenses incurred, the debate over 
campaign finance law in B.C. has been 
nowhere near as public or consequential 
as the debate over the broader electoral 
system.2 
Campaign finance law in British 
Columbia displays three notable 
elements: (1) there are no overall 
contribution limits, except for a limit on 
anonymous contributions; (2) there is no 
public financing for parties or candidates; 
and, (3) there are separate election 
expense limits, fixed in statute, for the 
pre-writ and campaign periods. 
As such, campaign finance law in 
British Columbia for candidates, 
constituency associations, and registered 




o there is no direct public funding 
for parties, local associations, or 
candidates 
o a tax credit is available for 
monetary contributions, the 
percentage of credit dependent 
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upon the amount given, up to a 
maximum of $500 credit 
Contributions: 
o there is no overall limit on political 
contributions 
o contributions may be accepted 
from individuals, corporations, or 
unions 
o contributions may be accepted 
from outside of the jurisdiction 
o single anonymous contributions 
cannot exceed $50, and 
anonymous contributions may 
only be received at a fundraising 
function 
o total anonymous contributions to a 
party or constituency association 
may not exceed $10,000 in a 
calendar year, and to a candidate 
may not exceed $3000 in relation 
to any one election 
Expenses: 
o during the 60 days before a 
campaign period, total expenses 
incurred by a political party must 
not exceed $1.1 million 
o during the 60 days before a 
campaign period, total expenses 
incurred by a candidate must not 
exceed $70,000 
o during a campaign period, total 
expenses incurred by a political 
party must not exceed $4.4 million 
o during a campaign period, total 
expenses incurred by a candidate 




Politics in Saskatchewan is 
typically characterised by its 
distinctiveness, due in large part to the 
electoral success of provincial political 
parties committed to democratic 
socialism (Wesley, 2011; Smith, 2009; 
Smith 2007; Leeson, 2001). However, as 
much as ‘distinct’ is an adjective apposite 
to describe the province’s political 
history, it is inappropriate to describe the 
province’s election laws. In a province 
where policy choices have so often been 
viewed as radical, electoral policy 
remains conventional. Perhaps one 
phenomenon explains the other: 
“Saskatchewan’s distinctiveness, a large 
part of which was attributable to its 
innovative public policies, acted as a 
brake on change” (Smith, 2005: 49). 
Changes to Saskatchewan’s 
election laws have been cautious and 
infrequent. The current provincial 
Election Act, which includes provisions 
governing campaign finance, was 
assented to in 1996; since that time the 
Act has been subject to amendments on 
12 occasions, and only five of these have 
been amendments directly pertaining to 
election administration rather than being 
corresponding amendments resulting 
from changes to other statutes. 
Major changes to election law in 
Saskatchewan over the past 17 years 
include the establishment of the position 
of chief electoral officer (CEO) as an 
independent officer of the legislative 
assembly (1998), the introduction of fixed 
election dates (2009), a ban on 
government advertising during campaign 
periods (2009), and the enactment of 
more stringent voter identification rules 
(2011). Most of these changes arrived in 
Saskatchewan after being thoroughly 
tested in other Canadian jurisdictions. 
Saskatchewan has little significant 
campaign finance reform to recount. In 
2005, as part of a comprehensive bill to 
clarify and modernize several aspects of 
the Act, election expense reimbursement 
levels were increased “to match federal 
levels” (Saskatchewan, 2005). 
The only other significant reform 
in the past 17 years has been the Political 
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 9, No. 1, 2015, 55-74 
61 
 
Contributions Tax Credit Act (2001). This 
legislation introduced a system of tax 
credits for resident individuals and 
corporations making monetary 
contributions to parties or candidates as 
well as for paying party membership fees. 
The tax credit cannot exceed $650. All 14 
Canadian jurisdictions provide tax credits 
for political contributions. 
Perhaps the most significant brake 
on change in recent times has been the 
state of the province’s election agency, 
Elections Saskatchewan. Writing in 2009, 
David Hamilton, then a consultant, but a 
former CEO of the Northwest Territories, 
observed a critical lack of leadership and 
resources (Hamilton 2009: 16). A full-
time CEO was finally appointed in 2012. 
The effect of this has already been seen in 
legislation amending Saskatchewan’s 
electoral process, which was passed in 
2014. 
Saskatchewan’s campaign finance 
regime is currently characterized by four 
notable aspects: (1) reimbursement of 
election expenses to registered political 
parties and candidates; (2) no limit on 
contributions; (3) contributions may be 
accepted from donors residing outside of 
the province, so long as they are from 
Canadian citizens; and, (4) election 
expense limits are differentiated by 
geographic location. 
As such, campaign finance law in 
Saskatchewan for candidates, 
constituency associations, and registered 




o reimbursement of up to 50% of 
election expenses incurred by a 
registered political party, if 15% of 
all valid votes cast are for the party 
o reimbursement of up to 60% of 
election expenses incurred by a 
candidate, if 15% of valid votes 
cast in the electoral district are for 
the candidate 
o tax credits for monetary 
contributions to a party or a 
candidate, or for the payment of 
membership fees to a party, up to a 
maximum of $650 credit 
Contributions: 
o no limit on contributions 
o contributions may be accepted 
from individuals, corporations, or 
unions 
o contributions may be accepted 
from outside of the jurisdiction, 
but must be from Canadian 
citizens 
o a single anonymous contribution 
limit of $250; no limit on the 
cumulative amount of anonymous 
contributions 
Expenses: 
o determination of election expense 
limits for registered political 
parties and candidates depends 
upon whether the election is being 
contested in a ‘northern’ or 
‘southern’ electoral district (two of 
58 electoral districts are 
‘northern’) 
o election expense limits for 
registered political parties 
adjusted using the Consumer Price 
Index, in accordance with a 
formula set out in legislation, or, in 
southern constituencies, the 
number of names on the voters 
list, whichever is greater 
o election expense limits for 
candidates adjusted using either 
the Consumer Price Index or the 
number of names on the voters list 
for the candidate’s electoral 
district, whichever is greater 
o a separate, and additional, 
adjusted annual limit on election 
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advertising expenses for 
registered political parties and 
associated entities 
o constituency associations are not 
required to report election 




Manitoba has long been an early 
adopter and innovator in the field of 
electoral policy. For example, in 1916, 
Manitoba became the first province to 
allow women to vote. In 1920, Manitoba 
was the first province to veer from the 
single member plurality electoral system 
for provincial elections, adopting STV in 
Winnipeg, and then later the alternative 
vote outside Winnipeg (Jansen, 2004). In 
1957, “Manitoba became the first 
Canadian jurisdiction to establish a 
system whereby periodic, independent, 
arms-length redistributions of electoral 
districts would be guaranteed” (Courtney, 
2001: 36). Political parties in Manitoba 
must subscribe to a code of ethics, the 
only jurisdiction in Canada where this is 
in place. More germane to the focus of this 
article, in 2000, Manitoba became only 
the second Canadian jurisdiction to 
outlaw political contributions from 
corporations and trade unions. And, in 
2012, Manitoba became the first 
jurisdiction in Canada to appoint an 
allowance commissioner to 
independently decide on the allocation of 
allowances to registered political parties. 
 
At the close of the 20th century, 
Manitoba had just elected an NDP 
government. At that time, its election laws 
were relatively comparable to those 
found in other jurisdictions in Canada. 
However, provincial election law came 
into sharp focus beginning in 1998 after 
an illegal vote-splitting scheme by the 
Progressive Conservatives was uncovered 
(Monnin, 1999; Smith, 2003). The ensuing 
political scandal became an underlying 
issue of the 1999 campaign and in turn 
motivated NDP government-sponsored 
legislation to reform provincial campaign 
finance law (Wesley and Stewart, 2006). 
 
The Election Finances Act was amended in 
2000 so that: 
 financial contributions from 
corporations, unions, and not-for-
profit organizations were banned 
 financial contributions from 
persons not ordinarily resident in 
the province were banned 
 annual financial contributions 
were capped at $3000 per 
individual 
 expenditures for party advertising 
during non-election years were 
capped at $50,000 per party, per 
annum.3 
 
As of 2001, Manitoba was only the 
second jurisdiction in Canada, after 
Quebec, to ban political contributions 
from corporations and trade unions. 
During the ensuing 14 years, Canada, 
Nova Scotia and Alberta have joined this 
minority of jurisdictions. Once again, this 
demonstrates Manitoba’s position as a 
pole-sitter in Canadian election law. 
 
Although reforms to Canadian election 
law are often portrayed as being non-
partisan and consensus-based, the story 
of these amendments support the thesis 
that parties in power will, where possible, 
bend the rules of the game when there is 
a perceived opportunity or advantage 
(James, 2012). Wesley and Stewart 
document two facts to support this claim: 
first, they demonstrate that reforms in 
Manitoba were enacted absent 
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meaningful consultation or sufficient 
consensus; second, they reveal, 
empirically, how, over the ensuing years, 
these reforms were initially advantageous 
to the NDP. 
Amendments in 2000 immediately 
affected provincial contribution and 
expenditure levels. First, they resulted in 
less total income for all political parties in 
Manitoba. Comparing general election 
years, Wesley and Stewart found that 
“combined party coffers were 51% lighter 
in 2003 compared against 1999” (2006: 
11-12). Perhaps not surprisingly, these 
changes also resulted in lower levels of 
campaign expenditure, as “total party 
spending in 2003 amounted to less than 
half (49%) of what it was in 1999” (2006: 
12). The story of these amendments is not 
simply one of an overall decrease, but 
more markedly one of fairness. Again, 
citing Wesley and Stewart: “In 2003, the 
New Democratic Party raised 173% more, 
and spent 191% more, than the Liberals 
and Conservatives, combined” (2006: 12).  
The Election Finances Act was again 
amended in 2006, 2008, and 2012, but 
most of these amendments were less 
notable than what happened in 2000. 
They largely concerned the clarification of 
rules and the reasonable adjustment of 
limits. For example, in 2008, the 
legislature updated – from June 1996 to 
June 2008 – the base month for the 
Consumer Price Index used to calculate 
election expense limits. 
The one additional reform that 
deserves probing is the 2008 introduction 
of an annual allowance for registered 
political parties. Initially, the allowance 
was based on the number of votes 
obtained by a party in the most recent 
preceding general election. 4  However, 
despite the introduction of allowances, 
both major parties, the PCs and the NDP, 
declined to accept the allowance between 
2009 and 2011 (Thomas 2013: 19). This 
bizarre outcome instigated the creation of 
an independent Allowance Commissioner 
in 2012. The Commissioner is responsible 
for making decisions (not 
recommendations) on the amount(s), 
timing, and manner of allowances to be 
paid to registered political parties 
(Thomas, 2013: 22). The allowance 
payable for 2012 was calculated 
according to a new formula established 
by regulation (see Annual Allowance for 
Registered Political Parties Regulation) 
and would be paid to parties for the first 
time in 2013. 
In general, campaign finance law in 
Manitoba is distinguished by three 
primary characteristics: (1) direct public 
financing for parties and candidates; (2) a 
ban on contributions from corporations 
and unions; and, (3) election advertising 
expense limits both during and outside of 
campaign periods. 
As such, campaign finance law in 
Manitoba for candidates, constituency 
associations, and registered political 




o reimbursement of some election 
expenses for a registered political 
party, in accordance with a 
formula, if 10% of all valid votes 
are obtained by the party 
o reimbursement of some election 
expenses for a candidate, in 
accordance with a formula, if 10% 
of all valid votes cast in an 
electoral district are obtained by 
the candidate 
o an annual allowance to registered 
political parties to defray costs of 
administration and operations, in 
accordance with a formula, as 
determined by the Allowance 
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Commissioner and established in 
regulations 
o tax receipts for monetary 
contributions to a party or a 
candidate (not to a constituency 
association) 
o tax credits for contributions, 
subject to the amount contributed, 
and determined in accordance 
with a formula 
 
Contributions: 
o an individual annual contribution 
limit of $3000 
o a ban on contributions from 
corporations, trade unions, and 
not-for-profit organizations 
o a ban on contributions from 
persons not ordinarily resident in 
the province 
o a single anonymous contribution 
limit of $10; no limit on the 
cumulative amount of anonymous 
contributions 




o election expense limits for 
registered political parties, by 
electoral district, calculated using 
the number of electors on the 
official list of electors 
o election expense limits for 
candidates, by electoral district, 
calculated using the number of 
electors on the official list of 
electors and subject to the size of 
the district 
o election advertising expense limits 
for registered political parties and 
candidates during a campaign 
period, calculated using the total 
number of electors on the official 
list of electors 
o advertising expense limits for 
registered political parties during 
an election year but outside of a 
campaign period must not exceed 
$268,000 
o advertising expense limits for 
candidates during an election year 
but outside of a campaign period 
must not exceed $6,500 
 
This is the comparative state of party 
finance regulatory regimes in these three 
provinces. What do the data reveal? 
Looking comparatively at the finances 
of the major parties in each of these three 
provinces, we develop a picture of 
provincial campaign finance. Our analysis 
begins with party revenue, particularly 
with a focus on contributions. The data 
presented below have been taken from 
the financial reports available on the 
websites of the provincial elections offices 
of each province. In order to improve 
comparability, we have adjusted the 
values below for inflation, using the Bank 
of Canada’s inflation calculator 5  to 
convert the nominal values to real 2012 
dollars. In addition, we have calculated 
per-capita expenditures and revenue 





Table 1 presents the total party 
revenue for each of the four years in real 
2012 dollars. The income figures exclude 
transfers from candidates and/or 
electoral district associations. Revenues 
are, not surprisingly, higher in election 
years than in other years during the cycle. 
The exception to that is Manitoba, where 
election expense reimbursements were 
paid the year after the general election 
(2012). Clearly, parties in these provinces 
seek to maximize their revenues at the 
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time when money is going to make the 
most difference. It is also likely that 
donors are more motivated to contribute 
when faced with an election. 
There are significant interprovincial 
differences. In particular, political parties 
in Saskatchewan raise significantly more 
income than their counterparts in 
Manitoba and British Columbia. This 
partially reflects the fact that the 
Saskatchewan Party is especially adept at 
fundraising (a point to be discussed 
later), but also that the provincial party 
finance regime does not restrict access to 
any major revenue sources, including 
those from outside the province. 
Saskatchewan’s political parties have 
access to public funding, individual 
donations, and to corporate and trade 
union donations, while parties in British 
Columbia do not have access to public 
financing and parties in Manitoba may 
not accept donations from corporations 
or unions. Although it can be difficult to 
make meaningful comparisons between 
the BC Liberals, the Saskatchewan Party, 
and the Manitoba Conservatives, we 
observe the same revenue disparity 
between the BC NDP, the Saskatchewan 
NDP and the NDP in Manitoba: the 
Saskatchewan NDP has much higher 
revenue per capita. 
The smallest parties – the Greens in 
BC and the Liberals in Manitoba – 
struggle to keep up with their larger 
competitors. 
 In all three provinces, the major 
right-wing competitor to the NDP has 
more revenue than the NDP, but the 
revenue imbalance differs significantly 
from province to province. Although the 
Saskatchewan NDP raises a lot of money 
relative to its social democratic 
counterparts in BC and Manitoba, it lags 
significantly behind the Saskatchewan 
Party, which raised 2.4 times as much 
money as the NDP over the four year 
period and in 2011 won the election with 
63% of the popular vote. In BC, the ratio 
between Liberal and NDP fundraising is 
1.8, in a province where the Liberals have 
won four consecutive elections but where 
the NDP remains quite competitive. 
Meanwhile, in Manitoba, the ratio 
between the PCs and NDP is only 1.3; this 
likely reflects the fact that the Manitoba 
NDP is the governing party, but is also 
likely due to party finance laws that 
prohibit contributions from corporations 
and unions. This is a reversal from the 
immediate aftermath of the 2000 
campaign finance reforms in Manitoba, 
where the NDP initially fared much better 
than the PCs (Wesley and Stewart, 2006). 
Partial support for the conclusion 
that party finance laws can affect the 
competitive balance between parties can 
be found in Table 2, which reports the 
proportion of donations from individuals, 
corporations, unions, and other sources. 
Table 1 reported all party income, 
including contributions, fundraising, and 
other revenue such as investment income. 
Table 2 is just based on contributions. 
 Manitoba stands out as distinctive, 
because all contributions are from 
individuals since the law prohibits 
donations from any alternative sources. 
The NDP in BC and Saskatchewan are 
broadly similar, with about two-thirds of 
income coming from individuals. The 
Saskatchewan NDP is slightly more 
dependent on corporate contributions 
than the BC NDP, which is more 
dependent on union contributions. The 
BC Liberals differ substantially from the 
Saskatchewan Party, despite the fact that 
both parties represent a right-of-centre 
option in the party system and both 
parties are in government. Nearly two-
thirds of the BC Liberals’ contributions 
come from corporations, while a majority 
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of the Saskatchewan Party’s contributions 
come from individuals. It would appear 
from financial contribution data that, to a 
much greater extent than in 
Saskatchewan, BC’s party system is a 
proxy battle between business and trade  
union interests.7
Table 1:  Party income (excluding transfers), real 2012 dollars 
 
Province/party 2009 2010 2011 2012 
British Columbia     
























Saskatchewan     
















Manitoba     
























Figures in italics are an election year; figures in parentheses are per-capita values 
 
   
 
Table 2:  Sources of contributions, 2009-2012 
 
Province/Party Individuals Corporations Unions Otherviii 
British Columbia     
 NDP 67.9% 6.5% 23.5% 2.1% 
 Liberals 29.2% 65.5% 0.1% 5.2% 
 Greens 94.9% 5.0% 0% 0.1% 
Saskatchewan     
 NDP 66.1% 16.9% 11.8% 5.2% 
 Saskatchewan Party 51.8% 45.9% 0.1% 2.1% 
Manitoba     
 NDP 100.0%    
 Progressive Conservative 100.0%    
 Liberals 100.0%    
Figures in italics are an election year; figures in parentheses are per-capita values. 




Table 3: Individual contributions, real 2012 dollars 
 
Province/party 2009 2010 2011 2012 
British Columbia     
























Saskatchewan     
















Manitoba     
























Figures in italics are an election year; figures in parentheses are per-capita values.
This picture is confirmed in Table 
3. When it comes to attracting individual 
donor support, the New Democratic 
parties in these provinces perform 
relatively similarly in fundraising from 
individuals, when measured per capita.   
 We found earlier that the BC 
Liberals had a larger advantage over the 
BC NDP than the Manitoba PCs had over 
the Manitoba NDP. Looking at the BC 
Liberals’ comparatively anemic record at 
individual fundraising, the source of this 
is almost entirely due to corporate 
donations. Although the Manitoba PCs 
raise more from individual donations 
than that province’s NDP, the same is not 
true of the BC Liberals, who trail the BC 
NDP in individual fundraising. The 
Manitoba PCs’ success at this is somewhat 
surprising, as Manitoba is the only 
jurisdiction considered here which places 
a limit on the maximum individual 
donation. The Saskatchewan Party’s 
individual fundraising success, however, 
dwarfs that of all other parties. The 
Saskatchewan Party’s per-capita 
individual donations in their worst year 
of fundraising (i.e., 2009) was higher than 
the best year for every other party except 
for the Manitoba Conservatives during an 
election year. 
Thus far, we have focused on 
private or non-state income in our 
analysis. Looking at the extent of direct 
public financing for political parties over 
a four-year period, we note significant 
interprovincial differences. At one 
extreme, British Columbia provides no 
direct public financing to political parties. 
At the other, Manitoba provides both an 
annual allowance and reasonably 
generous reimbursements for election 
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expenses. The situation in Manitoba is 
complicated by the fact that the annual 
allowance is politically controversial and 
parties can choose whether to accept it. In 
the period under examination here, only 
the Manitoba Liberals accepted the 
annual allowance; 32% of the party’s total 
income comes from public sources. 
Although the Manitoba Liberals lag 
significantly behind their two major 
competitors, they are undoubtedly in a 
stronger financial position because of this 
public support. The NDP and 
Conservatives received 15% and 16% of 
their total revenue from public sources in 
this period, respectively. Because both 
parties spent close to the same amount on 
their campaigns, their election 
reimbursements were close to the same 
amount. Because they both refused the 
allowance, the reimbursement is the only 
public money they received. Thus, the 
provision of public financing did little to 
alter the imbalance of resources between 
these two parties.  
In Saskatchewan, the election 
expenses reimbursement represents a 
tiny fraction of the parties’ financial 
support over the four-year period. The 
state contributed 2.5% of NDP revenue 
(excluding transfers), compared to only 
1.6% for the Saskatchewan Party. Public 
support is a relatively insignificant 
component of party financing in 
Saskatchewan. Indeed, relative to 
Canadian national parties (Jansen and 
Young, 2011), the parties observed in this 
study are relatively independent of the 
state. It should be remembered, however, 
that this is only a measure of direct public 
financing. If we included the indirect 
public support through political 
contribution tax credits, the amount of 
financial support from the state would be 
much higher. Calculating the indirect 
public financing of parties, however, is 
remarkably difficult (Jansen and Young, 
2011). 
There are clearly significant 
differences between the provinces in the 
total revenue available to parties, the mix 
of donations to parties, and the 
differential in financial competitiveness 
between the major parties. Although 
some of these differences are likely due to 
electoral legislation, others result from 
party cultures and party systems (Blake, 
2001 (a)). The contrast between the BC 
Liberals and Saskatchewan Party 
illustrates this most clearly. In BC, the 
Liberals are clearly a vehicle for corporate 
support while the Saskatchewan Party is 
much more heavily funded by individuals. 
This is despite the fact that there are no 
major differences between the two 
provinces in restrictions placed upon the 
source of contributions or the value of tax 
credits for individual donations. In fact, 
were corporate donations to be banned in 
both provinces, the BC Liberals would be 
at a significant disadvantage relative to 
the NDP, while the Saskatchewan Party 





Raising revenue is an important 
component of electoral success. 
Ultimately, though, the goal for political 
parties is to muster financial resources to 
earn votes in a general election. In Figure 
1, we look at real per-capita election 
spending in all three provinces. There are 
some important limitations in the 
comparisons here. Figure 1 only includes 
spending during the election campaign; 
pre-writ spending is not included. In 
addition, the provinces may define 
election spending differently. 9 
Consequently, interprovincial 
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comparisons should be interpreted with 
some caution.  
It is somewhat surprising that 
Manitoba’s two dominant parties spent 
more on their election campaigns than 
their counterparts in other the provinces, 
especially considering that their overall 
level of party financing was relatively 
lower. Conversely, Saskatchewan’s 
parties spent relatively less, despite the 
large amounts of money raised by parties 
in the province. Part of the explanation 
for this rests in the spending limits. 
Manitoba’s spending limit works out to 
$1.16 per capita in real 2012 dollars, the 
highest of the three provinces under 
examination here. Conversely, 
Saskatchewan has the lowest spending 
limit at $0.87 per capita in 2012 dollars. 
British Columbia is in the middle at $1.02 
per capita. To illustrate the importance of 
spending limits, in Alberta, which is the 
only province with no spending limits, the 
governing Progressive Conservatives 
spent $1.20 per capita in the 2012 
provincial election. 
Despite the relatively higher limit, 
the Manitoba NDP and Progressive 
Conservatives approached parity in their 
election spending. The Conservatives 
spent slightly more, but the NDP was able 
to almost match their opponent’s 
spending and marshal their financial 
resources to win the election. The 
spending gap between major parties in 
the other provinces was larger, but 
spending limits likely contributed to 
containing the gap. Given the 
Saskatchewan Party’s huge advantage in 
overall revenue and in fundraising from 
individuals, the fact that its advantage in 
election spending was significantly 
smaller in 2011 is testament to the 
importance of election expenses limits in 
preserving a degree of electoral 
competition. The same can be said about 




Although limited to the major 
parties in just three provinces, this article 
demonstrates the potential for 
comparative analysis of provincial party 
and election finance in order to discern 
the effect of election finance regimes on 
political party competition. We find that 
provincial election laws affect the amount 
of money political parties have available 
to fund their operations. For example, the 
availability of individual, union, and 
corporate donations along with election 
expense reimbursements have meant that 
parties in Saskatchewan have much more 
revenue than do parties in Manitoba and 
British Columbia. At the same time, 
interestingly, election laws are 
insufficient to explain the success of 
parties in Saskatchewan when it comes to 
raising money from individuals. The 
Saskatchewan Party consistently raises 
more money than other parties in these 
three provinces and enjoys a significant 
lead over the Saskatchewan NDP. We also 
note the importance of corporate and 
union donations as sources of revenue in 
British Columbia, particularly when 
compared to the other two provinces. It is 
also notable that, although changes to 
party finance law can confer an initial 
advantage upon a particular party, the 
case of Manitoba demonstrates the ability 
of parties to successfully adapt.  
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Figure 1:  Per-capita election expenditures in most recent election, real 2012 dollars 
We also observed the significance 
of election expense limits. Despite having 
the lowest overall revenue, Manitoba’s 
two dominant parties had approximate 
parity in spending, and during an election 
year spent the most money of any parties 
in these three provinces. The spending 
limit in Saskatchewan prevented the large 
advantage the Saskatchewan Party had in 
raising revenue from significantly 
distorting electoral competition, at least 
during the writ period. 
Future research into provincial 
party finance could go in a number of 
directions. Most obviously, the number of 
provinces considered could be expanded. 
Alberta, which is without spending limits, 
and Quebec, with its public funding as 
well as ban on corporate and union 
donations, are attractive cases to 
consider. The analysis of party finance 
over a longer timeframe could also be 
valuable, as it would help to analytically 
separate a particular party’s success at a 
particular time from the longer term 
impact of electoral finance laws. For 
example, is the Saskatchewan Party’s 
success in fundraising a reflection of 
party finance laws or merely indicative of 
the appeal of the party at a point in time? 
A more complete analysis of provincial 
party finance would also have to 
incorporate the financial activities of local 
manifestations of parties: the electoral 
district associations and candidates. Much 
party activity and membership 
engagement occurs at the local level 
(Carty, 2002); understanding financial 
activities at that level as well as 
relationships with the central party is 
critical to a complete picture of provincial 
party finance in Canada. 
Ultimately, though, these analyses 
require data this is accessible and of high 
quality. The current dearth and 
dissimilarity of data from provincial 
election agencies limits the potential for 
more extensive and complete 
comparisons. The situation has improved 
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and territorial election officials to ensure 
that financial data from political actors 
are reported in a way that is accessible 
and useful to the public. Although we fully 
recognize that assisting researchers is not 
the primary job of election officials, the 
quality and accessibility of data serves to 
enhance transparency in party and 
election finance. With better data, 
Canada’s provinces and territories could 
be an even more important laboratory to 
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Endnotes 
 
1 There has been substantial debate in the province 
over the regulation of third party election spending, 
an area not covered in this article. 
2 BC has adopted processes for initiative, referenda 
and recall, as well as held a provincial referendum on 
electoral system reform (e.g., see, Warren and Pearse, 
2008), 
3 Amendments effective 1 January 2001. 
4 In addition, there was a minimum payment of 
$10,000 when a party elected at least one Member of 
the Legislative Assembly and a base minimum 
payment of $600 regardless of the number of votes 
obtained or the success of any candidates. 
5http://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/related/inflatio
n-calculator/ 
6 Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 051-0001 
7 This phenomenon may also help explain why recent 
battles over the regulation of third party election 
spending have been so important to political actors in 
BC; e.g., see: British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v. 
British Columbia (Attorney General), 2009 BCSC 436.   
viii “Other” sources of income vary by province, but 
typically include contributions from non-profit 
associations or business associations. 
9 The definition of an election expense is particularly 
crucial in jurisdictions with direct public support, 
because the public has an interest in ensuring that 
public subsidies are expended on legitimate election 
expenses.  
